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• Contrary to findings of earlier studies, Legal capacity, the Capacity to absorb legal costs, and 
Own imposed protectionism could not be confirmed as statistically relevant in the agro-food 
sector in this purely bilateral context. 
• Consistent with the findings of Götz, Heckelei, Rudloff (2010) the influence of the variables 
Endured protectionism and WTO membership time could be supported as statistically 
relevant. The Influence of private actors could be verified under the lowest threshold .  
• Of the bilateral variables the influence of Agro-food export dependency could be supported 
under the lowest and of Agro-food import value under all thresholds on export value.
The dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the institution for the 
resolution of conflicts arising between members over the interpretation of their commitments 
under the regime of the organization. Dispute settlement has to be self-enforcing, i.e. from the 
consultation  up to  the  potential  compliance  phase  all  actions  are  driven  by  members.  The 
design of the WTO dispute settlement system is often at the core of the debate on institutional 
reforms of the WTO. A major requisition is to make the settlement system more effective and 
to allow for the appropriate consideration of developing countries’ demands. Reform proposals 
span a wide field (see e.g. Petersmann, 2003). However, the identification of improvements 
requires information on the factors driving the system, i.e. the determinants for complaining or 
not complaining. This is the starting point for the empirical analysis. 
The focus lies on agro-food related disputes with new and bilaterally dependent determinants. 
• Allowance for a more in-depth analysis of specific country characteristics not considered in 
previous studies, especially bilaterally dependent characteristics.
• Supplement the understanding of what drives participation in the dispute settlement system. 
Question: What are the most relevant country characteristics?
• The identification of relevant determinants allows for the evaluation of the system’s 
accessibility to different types of countries. 
• Improve the data quality to validate or disprove the findings on insignificant influences of 
some variables, e.g. the Importance of the agro-food export sector and bilaterally dependent 
characteristics like Members’ Trade retaliatory capacity. Concerning the latter indicator 
Members’ total trade retaliatory capacity might be a more consistent measure as retaliation 
in different trade sectors is also possible. 
• Apply methods for better data exploitation, e.g. by principal component analysis. This might 
help to mitigate the skewed sample problem resulting from the purely bilateral analysis. 
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Statistical implementation
(1) A bilateral trade flow (observation) between Member i and j might entail an infringement.
(2) It is interpreted as a binary choice situation that could lead to a dispute or not. 
Binary choice situation described as a Bernoulli trial with Bernoulli density:
( )
: Binary variable (complaint or no complaint)
: Member i's probability to complain against j






: Matrix of uni- and bilateral control variables
: Coefficient vector of K determinants
ij x
ȕ
(3) Individualization of the probability to complain is based on the logistic density –
to reflect a member’s traits and the characteristics of the trade relationship:
⇒ Leads to bilaterally dependent Logit model of agro-food related dispute initiations.
(4) Observations or binary choice situations are defined as bilateral agro-food related 
trade flows from the potential complainant to the potential defendant Member.
(5) Proceeding for the assessment of determinants => Reproduce the observed 
sample of bilateral dispute initiations over the period from January 1, 1995 to 
December 31, 2005.
(6) Due to the limited number of disputes in bilateral relationships, efficient estimation 
requires application of the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likelihood 
estimator developed by Manski and Lerman (1977). Observations with y=1 were 
oversampled to enrich the skewed original sample. The resulting sample selection 
bias is then mitigated in the estimation process by weighing the likelihood 
contributions based on their proportion in the sample in relation to their true 
proportion in the population. 
(7) Under the assumption of independent and identically distributed observations 
maximum likelihood is applied and the log-likelihood function is given as
(8) Observations/bilateral export flows are compiled based on thresholds on their value:  
Only those bilateral trade flows are collected for complainant-defendant 
combinations that are worth enough to fight for ($300K for low, $500K for medium 
and $700K for high litigation costs; based on calculations of Nordström (2005). 
(9) Model selection and validation: 
- Selection is based on Akaike information criterion (Penalty on degrees of 
freedom loss).                                            
- The variables’ joint significant influence is validated using bootstrapped test 
statistics.
- The quality of the model is further on validated by a likelihood ratio test.
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Exploratory variables  $0 $300K $500K $700K
BETA 0 -14.025 -12.078 -11.811 -11.643
Endured 
protectionism  not included ***2.150   (0.89) ***2.196   (0.92) ***2.269   (0.87)
Own imposed 
protectionism not included not included - 0.516   (0.66) - 0.511   (0.66)
Influence of private 
actors ***0.734   (0.31) not included not included not included
WTO membership 
time *3.923   (2.67) *3.754   (2.47) **3.887   (2.09) **3.864   (2.31)
Agro-food Export 
dependency **0.972   (0.47) not included not included not included
Agro-food import 
value from defendant ***2.652   (0.21) ***1.384   (0.33) ***1.108   (0.30) ***0.981   (0.35)
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level
Level of significance for Likelihood ratio test on model specification: 1% under all thresholds.
Thresholds on export value
Explanatory variables Data Source Expected sign
Endured protectionism by 
trade partner














Capacity to absorb legal 
costs/wealth*
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) World Bank 
(2007) +
Influence of private actors Measure of  legal dimensions of 




Importance of agro-food 
export sector
Share of agro-food related 
export value in GDP
Word Bank (2007)
+
WTO membership time Index based on a member's 






Agro-food export value Complainant's total agro-food 
export value to defendant
EuroCare (2006)
+
Agro-food import value Complainant's total agro-food 





Share of complainant's agro-
food export value to defendant  






Share of complainant's agro-
food import value from 




Agro-food trade retaliatory 
capacity
Share of defendant's agro-food 




* Influencing factors already integrated in previous empirical investigations
Unilateral explanatory variables
Bilateral explanatory variables
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